Performance measures for hierarchical organizations: Frontier analysis as a decision support tool by Aude Deville et al.







  January 2009 
 
 







Performance measures for hierarchical 
organizations: Frontier analysis as a 




LEG-FARGO, IAE, University of Bourgogne 
Gary D. Ferrier
 
Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas 
Hervé Leleu
 











IÉSEG School of Management  
Catholic University of Lille 
3, rue de la Digue  
F-59000 Lille 
www.ieseg.fr  
Tel: 33(0)3 20 54 58 92 
Fax: 33(0)3 20 57 48 55 Performance measures for hierarchical organizations:  
  Frontier analysis as a decision support tool 
 
Aude DEVILLE 
LEG-FARGO, IAE, University of Bourgogne 
PEG, BP 26 611, 21 066 Dijon cedex, France 
Tel: 00. 33. 380. 593. 505, E-mail: aude.deville@u-bourgogne.fr 
 
Gary D. FERRIER 
Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas 
Business Building, Room 402, Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201 USA 
Tel: 00.1.479.  575.6223, E-mail: gferrier@walton.uark.edu   
 
Hervé LELEU 
CNRS/LEM and IÉSEG School of Management 
3 rue de la Digue, 59000 Lille, France 




Abstract:  We extend the standard frontier efficiency models (data envelopment analysis [DEA] and stochastic 
frontier analysis [SFA]) by allowing the “decision making units” (DMUs) whose performances are assessed to 
consist of two different levels within hierarchical organizations. Generally, the lower level unit is responsible for 
“operations;” while higher level units are assumed to make “strategic” decisions. Our primary contribution in 
this paper is thus to extend the use of frontier efficiency models to assess each level performance with relevant 
technical and allocative inefficiency measures.  We illustrate our approach using DEA applied to data from a 
sample of 1,585 branches of a major French bank.  A second contribution of the paper is to explicitly relate the 
efficiency to differences in the operating environments and the sizes of the bank branches.  We believe that the 
simple, easy to implement method we introduce can serve as a valuable component of a “balanced score card” 
approach to benchmarking performance within hierarchical settings such as a banking network. 
 
Résumé : Dans cet article, nous évaluons la performance d’organisations en considérant explicitement deux 
niveaux de décision. Nous étendons ainsi les modèles d’évaluation traditionnels d’enveloppement des données 
(DEA)  ou  les  frontières  stochastiques  (SFA).  Généralement,  ces  organisations  sont  caractérisées  par  deux 
niveaux :  le  niveau  inférieur,  en  charge  des  activités  de  production  et  le  niveau  supérieur,  davantage 
responsable  des  décisions  stratégiques.  Notre  principale  contribution  est  donc  d’étendre  l’utilisation  des 
modèles de frontière de production pour évaluer chaque niveau de décision avec des mesures de performance 
techniques et allocatives adaptées. Nous appliquons ensuite notre approche à une base de données comprenant 
1585 agences d’un même groupe bancaire français. Une seconde contribution de ce travail est la prise en 
compte explicite de l’environnement commercial et de la taille des agences dans leur processus d’évaluation. 
Nous  pensons  que  l’approche  que  nous  proposons  peut  être  utile  à  l’élaboration  de  tableaux  de  bord  qui 
différencient  les  différents  niveaux  hiérarchiques  typiques  des  activités  en  réseau  comme  dans  le  secteur 
bancaire. 
 
JEL Codes: M40, G21, C43. 
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Performance measures for hierarchical organizations: 
A decision support tool 
“What you measure is what you get.” 
—Kaplan and Norton (1992, p. 71) 
 
1.  Introduction 
In principle, organizations are optimizers.  However, whether they attempt to maximize profit, 
revenue, or services provided, or to minimize cost or defects, or to achieve some combination 
of these goals and others, organizations are dependent upon the actions of decision-makers 
whose goals may not be the same as that of the organization.  Management control systems 
(MCS) are one means to assure that an organization’s goals are achieved.  Organizational 
structure or design also plays an important role in influencing organizational performance.  
For  example,  Mookherjee  and  Reichelstein  (1997)  proposed  a  model  of  budgeting  in 
hierarchical organizations and analyzed its optimality in terms of the incentives it creates and 
the coordination it achieves. They demonstrated that a variety of hierarchical arrangements 
can  be  equally  effective  in  creating  incentives  and  coordinating  decisions  provided  the 
organization uses an appropriate responsibility accounting.  Brickley et al. (2004) argued that 
a  key  issue  in  organizational  design  is  assuring  that  decision  makers  not  only  have  the 
relevant information needed to make decisions, but that they must also be provided with the 
incentive to use the information to achieve organizational objectives.  Brickley et al. (2004) 
further reasoned that organizational architecture is analogous to a three-legged stool for which 
three legs—the assignment of decision rights, the evaluation of performance, and the rewards 
system—must be appropriately balanced.  
 
In this paper we focus on one of the legs of the stool, performance evaluation, in a particular 
setting, hierarchical organizations, through the novel application and interpretation of frontier 
efficiency  analysis.
1    Generally,  lower  level  units  within  a  hierarchical  organization  are 
responsible for “operations;” therefore, their performance can be assessed using a measure of 
technical efficiency—i.e., a measure of whether the levels of inputs and/or outputs have been 
optimized.  Higher level units within an organization typically make “strategic” decisions.  
Higher level, or centralized, decisions may also involve the allocation of resources among 
lower level units; hence, higher level units can be assessed using a measure of allocative 
                                                 
1  Two  general  approaches  to  frontier  efficiency  analysis  are  stochastic  frontier  analysis  (SFA)  and  data 
envelopment analysis (DEA).  For a detailed introduction to these methods, see Coelli et al. (2005). 
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efficiency—i.e.,  a  measure  of  whether  the  mixes  of  inputs  and/or  outputs  have  been 
optimized.  As in the case of standard applications of frontier efficiency models, the overall 
performance of a hierarchical organization is given by the combination of the technical and 
allocative performances of the lower and higher levels, respectively, of the hierarchy. 
 
Our  primary  contribution  in  this  paper  is  thus  to  provide  a  means  of  assessing  the 
contributions of different levels of a hierarchical organization to its overall performance by 
extending  the  use  of  frontier  efficiency  models.    Identifying  and  quantifying  inefficient 
performance across different levels of an organization can provide valuable insights into how 
to improve overall organizational performance.
2  A second contribution of this paper is to 
show  how  to  explicitly  relate  differences  in  performance  to  differences  in  the  operating 
environments and the sizes of the lower level units in the firm.  We postulate that lower level 
units operating in different environments could face different production technologies and 
that optimal product-mixes could vary with the size of the lower level unit.  We believe that 
the simple, easy to implement method we introduce can serve as a valuable component of a 
“balanced score card” approach to benchmarking performance within a hierarchical setting.
3 
 
The next section of the paper further motivates our analysis.  We then present our models in 
section 3.  Section 4 provides an application of our ideas to a French banking organization 
that operates 1,585 branches in 17 different regions of the country.  In section 5 we present a 
summary and conclusion. 
 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
Traditionally, accounting and financial reporting have played an important role in evaluating 
the performance of organizations.
4  These measures capture the “financial perspective” of 
performance.  Kaplan and Norton (1992) argued that a broader array of measures should be 
taken into consideration when examining performance.  In particular, they advocated the use 
of  a  “balanced  scorecard”—the  evaluation  of  performance  from  various  perspectives—to 
better assess and improve performance.  The performance measures we use in this paper take 
                                                 
2 For example, Demski (1972) argued that performance evaluations help to inform principals about the choice 
problem, to inform agents about their decisions, and to align the interests of agents with those of principals. 
3 See Budde (2007) for a discussion of the incentive effects of the balanced scorecard. 
4 Demski (1972, p. 243) noted that, “[a]ccounting measurements have many and varied uses; and for any specific 
use the conceivable array of alternative measurement methods often borders on the bewildering.”  Performance 
evaluation  is  just  one  of  the  “many  and  varied  uses”  of  accounting  data.    Rather  than  contributing  to  the 
“bewilderment,” we hope that use of accounting data introduced in this paper provides a simple, complementary 
tool for performance evaluation. 
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an “internal perspective,” assessing how well “inputs” are transformed into “outputs.” By 
incorporating  output  prices  into  the  analysis,  the  performance  measures  have  a  straight-
forward  revenue  interpretation  that  serves  as  a  valuable  supplement  to  more  traditional 
“financial  perspective”  performance  measures.    Both  perspectives  shed  light  on  “…two 
seemingly innocuous questions:  what might it cost, and did it cost too much?” (Demski, 
2008, p. 1; italics in the original).  By viewing performance from these two perspectives (as 
well as others), a more “balanced” evaluation of performance can be gained (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992).  In particular, we use frontier analysis, a benchmarking tool based on observed 
best-practice,  to  assess  the  performance  of  a  hierarchical  organization.    Frontier  analysis, 
available  in  two  major  variants—stochastic  frontier  analysis  (SFA)  and  data  envelopment 
analysis  (DEA)—has  become  increasingly  popular  both  in  the  academic  literature  and  in 
practice.    We  present  a  novel  use  of  frontier  analysis  as  a  means  to  generate  an  overall 
evaluation of an organization’s operational performance and then show how to decompose the 
overall measure into performance evaluations at two different levels in a decision making 
hierarchy. 
 
Consider a hierarchical organization with two levels—a centralized level (“top management”) 
and  a  decentralized  level  (e.g.,  “sales  offices”).    Each  level  of  the  hierarchy  uses  its 
specialized knowledge to make its decisions.  Centralized decision makers will likely have 
better  knowledge  with  regards  to  pricing  (a  strategic  variable),  while  the  decentralized 
decision makers will likely have better knowledge about local customer characteristics, local 
competition,  etc.    Thus,  we  assume  that  the  top  management  makes  decisions  regarding 
product pricing and the allocation of resources to lower level units.  The sales offices (retail 
bank branches in the application presented below) can be thought of as revenue centers
5—
they make operational decisions regarding the level of service to offer, which customers to 
target, etc.  The objective of the top management in this case is to select a set of product 
prices that will generate the revenue maximizing mix of product sales; the goal of the sales 
offices is to sell as much output as possible given the prices set by “headquarters” and the 
resources made available to them. 
 
We assume that decision rights have been appropriately assigned, with some decision rights 
being centralized, while others are decentralized.  To assure that each level of the hierarchy 
                                                 
5 While our focus is revenue efficiency and its decomposition, our approach can easily be extended to the 
evaluation of profit centers and cost centers by examining profit and cost efficiency, respectively. 
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makes good decisions, incentives must be provided.  To assure that incentives have been 
properly set, performance needs to be assessed.  Once the performance of each level of the 
hierarchy is evaluated, rewards/incentives and the assignment of decision rights can be altered 
if performance is found to be deficient.  This is consistent with Ittner et al. (2003), who noted 
that many firms are adopting strategic performance management as a part of their overall 
planning activities.   
 
Given  that  it  is  unlikely  that  an  absolute  level  of  performance  can  be  established  due  to 
uncertainty in the market, relative performance evaluations are often appropriate.  For  an 
organization with multiple units performing essentially similar tasks (e.g., sales offices) their 
performances can be assessed relative to one another.  This is exactly what frontier analysis is 
designed  to  do—measure  relative  performance  by  benchmarking  entities  against  observed 
“best practice.”  Thus, our approach is consistent with the literature on relative performance 
evaluation (Dopuch and Gupta, 1997, Brickley et al., 2004).  While based upon a relative 
performance  measure,  our  approach  is  consistent  with  the  contingency  approach  to 
management—separate benchmarks can be established for different operating environments.  
This recognizes that there may not be “one best way” to operate; rather, it accounts for factors 
beyond decision makers’ control, which helps to obtain “buy in” from those being evaluated. 
 
3.  The benchmarking models 
Our models are based on an approach for measuring the economic (e.g., profit, revenue, cost), 
technical,  and  allocative  efficiencies  that  has  become  increasingly  popular  among  both 
academics  and  practitioners—frontier  analysis.    However,  we  offer  a  novel  means  of 
employing the method, one that offers insights not available from standard applications of the 
techniques. 
 
We assume that the objective of the organization is the maximization of revenue, though other 
“economic” goals (e.g., profit maximization or cost minimization) could also be assumed and 
the models could easily be modified to account for these alternative objectives.  Thus, in the 
models presented below the performance of revenue centers is being assessed. 
 
Suppose that an organization uses N different inputs (represented by the vector 
N x + Î ℝ ) to 
product M different outputs (represented by the output vector 
M y + Î ℝ ).  The organization 
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transforms the inputs into outputs using a production process.  This production process can be 
represented by the output correspondence which maps inputs into subsets of outputs called the 
output set,  ( ) P x .  The output set designates all technologically-feasible output vectors for a 
given input vector; i.e.,  ( ) { } : P x y y can be produced from x = .
6 
 
Now suppose that the outputs y are sold at prices p, where 
M p + ℝ .  The maximum potential 
revenue is obtained if the firm can solve the following optimization problem: 
( ) ( ) { } , max : y R x p p y y P x ¢ = × Î .           (1) 
The  revenue  function,  ( ) , R x p ,  indicates  the  maximum  feasible  revenue  given  an  input 
quantity vector (x) and an output price vector (p).  Revenue is maximized through the choice 
of  the  optimal  vector  of  outputs,  y*.    The  maximization  of  revenue  requires  that  two 
conditions are met.  First, as much output as is technically feasible must be produced; second, 
the mix of outputs produced must be optimal given output prices.  The former condition 
implies  that  revenue  is  maximized  only  when  technical  efficiency  (discussed  below)  is 
achieved.  The latter condition implies that resources must be properly allocated across the 
production of different outputs so as to obtain the revenue maximizing mix of output; i.e., 
allocative efficiency (discussed below) must be achieved.  Following Farrell (1957), revenue 
efficiency (RE) is calculated as  ( ) , / ,
o RE R x p R =  where  ( ) , * R x p p y ¢ = ×  is maximum 
potential revenue as given by equation (1) and 
o o R p y ¢ = ×  is the observed revenue actually 
generated by the organization.  Note that RE has a minimum value of 1—this occurs when 
potential  revenue  and  observed  revenue  coincide;  i.e.,  revenue  performance  cannot  be 
improved and the organization is 100 percent revenue efficient.  Revenue efficiency scores 
greater than 1 indicate the presence of revenue inefficiency; in this case, RE gives that factor 
by which observed revenue would be enhanced if the organization were to realize “best-
practice” performance.  For example, RE = 1.25 indicates that revenue would be 25 percent 
greater if the organization operated at the optimal point on the revenue frontier; alternatively, 




  -  
 
 short of potential revenue. 
 
                                                 
6  We  assume  that  technology  satisfies  the  standard  Shephard  axioms  of  production—i.e.,  the  possibility  of 
producing no output, the impossibility of producing outputs without inputs, the free disposability of inputs and 
outputs, convexity, and variable returns to scale (see Färe and Primont (1995) for details). 
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As  noted  above,  revenue  efficiency  (or  any  measure  of  economic  efficiency)  has  two 
constituent  pieces—technical  efficiency  (which  involves  finding  optimal  levels)  and 
allocative  efficiency  (which  involves  finding  an  optimal  mix).    We  first  discuss  the 
measurement of technical efficiency; the measurement of allocative efficiency is discussed 
below.  In a revenue context, technical efficiency is measured as the maximum proportionate 
increase in output that is feasible given the available inputs and technology.
7  Conceptually, 
this output-oriented measure of technical efficiency (TE) is the maximum radial expansion of 
the observed output vector that remains a member of the output set; i.e., 
( ) { } max : , TE R y P x l l l + = Î × Î           (2) 
Note that all outputs are scaled by the same factor λ; thus, TE is a “radial measure.”—the mix 
of outputs remains constant but the level of outputs is expanded until the output vector y lies 
on the boundary of the production possibilities set.  TE takes on a minimum value of 1; the 
measure gives the amount by which output must be scaled up to lie on the boundary of the 
output set.  For example, TE = 1.25 indicates that 25 percent more output would be produced 
if technical inefficiency were removed; alternatively, output is only 80 percent (1-1/1.25) of 
its potential “best practice” level. 
 
The  second  component  of  overall  performance  that  is  to  be  evaluated  is  the  allocative 
efficiency of an entity.  Allocative efficiency involves finding the right mix of outputs in this 
case—resources must be allocated across the production of the M different outputs in such a 
way that the revenue maximizing combination of outputs is produced.  Because the technical 
efficiency measure is radial (i.e., mix-preserving), the allocative efficiency (AE) measure is 
simply a “residual” measure that is easily computed once measures of RE and TE have been 
obtained (see Farrell, 1957): 




=                   (3) 
 
Allocative efficiency, AE, also ranges from 1 and up; it can be interpreted as the proportion by 
which revenue could be expanded if the observed output mix were adjusted to the optimal 
mix based on observed “best-practice.” 
                                                 
7 Our approach is “output-oriented” in that it involves adjusting outputs while leaving input use unchanged.  In a 
cost efficiency context, technical efficiency involves the maximum feasible proportionate contraction of inputs 
with a given technology that would preserve the observed level of output.  Because of this, the cost efficiency 
approach is said to be “input-oriented.”  Efficiency measures that simultaneously adjust both the outputs and the 
inputs also exist. 
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Earlier,  we  argued  that  the  centralized  decision  making  by  top  management  involved 
determining the resources to allocate to the sales offices and the optimal output prices—
allocative efficiency is thus a measure of top management performance.  That is, it evaluates 
how well resources were allocated and prices were set.  The decentralized decision making of 
the sales offices involved producing the maximum output from available resources—thus, 
technical efficiency is a measure of lower level decision making in the hierarchy.  That is, it 
measured  whether  output  levels  were  maximized  by  the  lower  level  unit.    Together,  the 
performances of the centralized and decentralized decision makers (AE and TE, respectively) 
determine the overall performance (RE) of the organization. 
 
Figure 1 graphically depicts the three performance measures presented above for the simple 
case of two outputs.  We begin by illustrating the notion of overall (revenue) efficiency and 
then demonstrate how this measure is decomposed into measures of technical and allocative 
efficiency.  Consider the observed output vector y
o in Figure 1.  Because y
o is in the interior of 
( ) P x  rather than on its boundary, or frontier, the observed output vector is less than the 
potential level.  The revenue associated with y
o is given by 
o o R p y ¢ = × .  Maximum revenue, 
the solution to equation (1)—i.e.,  ( )
* , R x p p y ¢ = × —is characterized by a point of tangency 
between the line representing the output price ratio  2 1 ( / ) p p  and the boundary of  ( ) P x —i.e., 
by point y* in Figure 1.  Revenue efficiency is the ratio of potential to observed revenue—i.e., 
( ) , *
o o






.  As noted above, observed revenue falls short of potential revenue 
for two reasons—first, “too little” output is produced; second, the “wrong” mix of outputs is 
produced. 
 
Next, consider the technical efficiency of the observed output vector y
o in Figure 1.  Again, 
because y
o is in the interior of  ( ) P x  it is inefficient.  The technical efficiency measure, TE, 
radially expands y
o by the maximum amount consistent with  ( ). P x  That is, TE projects the 
inefficient point y
o to an efficient point 
o TE y × on the boundary of  ( ) P x ; the “output gap” 
between y
o and 
o TE y ×  is technical inefficiency.  Note that if an observed output vector is on 
the boundary of  ) P x  then there is no output gap and TE = 1; however, if an observed output 
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vector is on the interior of  ( ) P x  (such as y
o in Figure 1) then TE > 1.  Note that the efficiency 
is measured along the observed product-mix and thus considers a proportionate change in the 
outputs.    With  the  removal  of  technical  inefficiency,  revenue  would  be  enhanced  to 
( ).
o p TE y ¢× ×   While this is greater than the observed revenue, it still falls short of potential 
revenue because the mix of outputs is suboptimal—i.e., allocative inefficiency is present. 
 
Figure 1.  Measuring Overall (Revenue) Efficiency and it Components, 
Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
 
 
In Figure 1, note that the revenue maximizing output mix (i.e., the output mix given by y*) is 
different from the observed mix of outputs (i.e., the mix associated with y
o and 
o TE y × ).  The 
optimal output mix takes into account the output prices in choosing the product-mix that 
maximizes revenue.  Any inefficiency associated with the observed product-mix is captured 
by the measure of allocative efficiency.  In Figure 1, if the mix of outputs were changed in a 
manner consistent with their relative prices—more of output 1 and less of output 2—then 
revenue could be further enhanced.  That is, by moving along the boundary of ( ) P x  from the 
point 
o TE y ×  to y*, revenue can be expanded (to the maximum possible level) without an 












Output price ratio : p2/p1 
Observed revenue: R
o = p’ y
o 
Maximal revenue: R(x,p) = p’ y* = RE R






Revenue at the technical 
efficient point: p’ (TE y
o) 
 
y* = argmax R(x,p) 
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To summarize, Figure 1 illustrates a “revenue gap” that results from too little output being 
produced  (technical  inefficiency)  and  from  a  suboptimal  mix  of  outputs  (allocative 
inefficiency).  Correcting the level and mix of outputs closes the revenue gap, allowing the 
organization to achieve maximum potential revenue.   
 
Now  that  the  notions  of  overall  (revenue),  technical  and  allocative  efficiency  have  been 
presented, we next turn to the calculation of these three efficiency measures.  To compute the 
efficiency measures, we need to establish the benchmark relative to which performance is 
assessed.    Unfortunately,  the  true  output  set  ( ) P x   is  not  observed.    Instead,  the  “best-
practice” technology is determined and performance is measured relative to the observed best 
practice. 
 
As noted earlier, two common approaches for measuring efficiency are the stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA).  We adopt the latter method; for a 
discussion of SFA, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  Suppose that the organization being 
evaluated has K lower level units in its hierarchy; thus, we would observe K pairs of input and 
output  vectors—( ) , , 1,...,
k k x y k K = .    As  observed  production  plans,  these  K  input-output 
combinations  are  clearly  feasible  though  not  necessarily  efficient.    What  needs  to  be 
determined is the boundary, or envelope, of the K observed production plans—i.e., the “best-
practice” technology relative to which the efficiency of each observed decentralized “sales 
office”  is  evaluated.    An  operational  definition  of  the  output  set  that  satisfies  the  basic 





; ; 1 ;
1 ; 1; 0 1 ,
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k k k k
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= : Î Î ³ , = ,..., 






  (4) 
where the  k z  are “intensity variables,” or weights, that form the linear combinations of all 
observations’ inputs and outputs that determine the boundary of  ( ). P x  
 
From this operational definition of the output set, maximum feasible revenue and technical 
efficiency  can  be  computed  for  each  of  the  K  observed  lower  level  units  by  solving  the 
following two linear programs once for each of the j = 1, …, K lower level units in the 
hierarchical organization:  
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⋯             (P2) 
 
The  constraints  in  (P1)  and  (P2)  are  simply  the  output  set  given  by  equation  (4)—i.e., 
technology (represented by the output set) constrains the maximum levels of both revenue and 
the output that can be achieved from a given set of inputs. 
 
As  noted  above,  it  may  be  desirable  to  evaluate  performance  contingent  upon  the 
environmental  factors  facing  different  decision  makers.    Such  “contingent  efficiency 
evaluations” can easily be accommodated by creating different “reference” or “best practice” 
technologies through the appropriate grouping of observations.  This is done based on an 
analysis of a variety of environmental variables and the opinions of experts in our application 
presented in the next section. 
 
To summarize, based on the results of the two linear programs (P1) and (P2) presented above, 
the  revenue  (overall)  efficiency,  and  its  components  technical  efficiency  and  allocative 
efficiency, are calculated as: 
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1)  Revenue efficiency :  )
0 0
, * R x p p y
RE
p y p y
¢×
= =
¢ ¢ × ×    
2)  Technical efficiency:  * TE l =  






R x p p y RE p y
AE






4.  An Application to a Large French Banking Firm 
4.1  Motivation for the Application 
In this section we apply the approach presented above to a sample of 1,585 French bank 
branches.    These  branches  all  operate  under  the  same  brand,  but  are  distributed  among 
seventeen independent regional banks.  Within each regional banking group two decision-
making levels, each with its own objectives, interact—one at the top bank level and another at 
the branch level (i.e., the retail banking network).  It is vital for any successful organization to 
clearly identify the responsibility and decision rights of each level in conjunction with the 
other  two  legs  of  the  stool—performance  evaluation  and  the  incentives  system.    In  our 
application of the models presented above, we address managerial control and the ability to 
maintain coherent decision-making between policies made at the top banking group level and 
the performance measures of the sales offices or branches.   
 
We assume that a manager (at either the branch or bank level) acts to maximize his own 
utility: first the top bank managers aim at maximizing the Net Banking Product (denoted 
NBP)
8  by  making  decisions  about  the  locations,  resource  allocations,  and  “product-mix” 
strategies of the branches; second, the branch  managers make decisions to optimize their 
commissions which are directly related to the branch performance.  Conventionally, partial 
productivity indices, such as deposits per employee, or financial savings per employee, are 
used to evaluate branch performance.  These indices evaluate the performance of branches, 
and the top bank management provides incentives (such as commissions) that depend on their 
performance  levels.    Moreover,  the  top  bank  management  uses  these  incentives  to 
communicate  their  product  strategy.    However,  integrating  both  objectives  in  a  common 
decision  support  tool  is  not  an  easy  task  because  the  top  bank  managers’  performance 
language  is  financial  (profitability  objectives)  and  the  branches  managers’  performance 
                                                 
8 Net Banking Product (NBP) is the sum of net income interest income, net commissions, and net profit from 
financial transactions. 
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language is operational (i.e., sales objectives to maximize the commissions).  Moreover, one 
has to clearly identify the specific responsibilities in order to define appropriate measures of 
performance.    Although  the  objectives  at  the  two  levels  of  the  hierarchy  are  different  in 
nature, our performance evaluation model allows us to link these two objectives.  The model 
aims at evaluating the performance of a branching network with two decision levels (branches 
and top bank management) to answer the following three questions: 
(Q1)  What is the source of organizational inefficiency: top management, branch 
  management, or both?  
After that, we analyze the implications of the empirical results on strategic control practices:  
(Q2)  Are the inefficiencies of top bank management and the branches correlated? 
(Q3)  How  does  top  management  need  to  adapt  the  incentives  plan  to  achieve 
maximal NBP? 
 
Within our framework, we estimate the branch management inefficiency as the inability to 
maximize the level of output given an assigned allocation of resources while operating in a 
particular market environment.  For the bank top management, inefficiency is defined as the 
inability of the banking group to maximize the NBP given their margin rates on activities.  
We  explicitly  relate  the  latter  inefficiency  to  the  market  environment  and  to  the  size  of 
branches.    We  postulate  that  branches  in  different  environments  could  face  different 
production  technologies  and  that  optimal  product-mixes  could  vary  with  the  size  of  the 
branches. 
 
Our application contributes to the literature on the performance evaluation of branch banking.  
While there are literally hundreds of studies of bank performance at the organizational level, 
there are, as noted by McEachern and Paradi (2007) few studies of bank performance at the 
branch level.  One main reason for this fact is the difficulty to obtain specific data.  The first 
paper was published by Sherman and Gold (1985), comparing 14 branches of a US bank, 
followed by Parkan (1987), Oral and Yolalan (1990), Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990), Giokas 
(1991),  Tulkens  (1993),  Al-Faraj  et  al.  (1993),  and  Sherman  and  Ladino  (1995).    These 
studies are focused on the operational efficiency of the branches.  More recently, the global 
performance  of  the  branches  was  the  main  interest  in  evaluating  its  productivity,  its 
profitability, or its service quality (Schaffnit et al. 1997, Athanassopoulos 1997, Soteriou and 
Zenios  1999,  Hartman  et  al.  2001,  Camanho  and  Dyson  2008,  Conceiçao  et  al.  2007). 
However, all of these papers only addressed performance at the branch level efficiency; none 
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of them linked branch performance to the performance of top bank management.  Under our 
approach,  measures  of  both  branch  efficiency  and  overall  bank  network  efficiency  are 
developed. 
 
Two of the above papers are most closely related to our application.  First, Athanassopoulos 
(1998)  notes  that  while  operationally  similar,  bank  branches  face  different  market 
environments.  Failure to account for factors beyond branch managers’ control will reduce 
their “buy in” of a performance evaluation scheme.  Athanassopoulos accounted for factors 
that differentiated branches and clustered similar branches in order to achieve a homogenous 
set to which to apply performance measures.  Following his lead, we account for market 
environment in our study and we explicitly specify a different production technology for each 
environment.    Second,  McEachern  and  Paradi  (2007)  study  the  performance  of  a 
multinational bank’s branches within (intra-) a given country and then compare their findings 
across  (inter-)  countries.    We  adopt  their  managerial  objective  of  intra-  and  inter-market 
performance analysis by analyzing the relative performance of seventeen networks.  Finally, 
we note that our approach supports the claim of Berger et al.  (1997, p. 141) that, “[a]n 
understanding  of  bank  branch  efficiency  may  help  resolve  a  number  of  conceptual, 
measurement, and policy questions about efficiency at the bank level.” 
 
4.2  Modifying the model to account for outputs measured in value terms 
In the models developed above, inputs and outputs were assumed to be traditional “physical” 
units measured as “quantities.”  In many cases, however, data may be available in terms of 
monetary values rather than physical quantities.  For example, in banking studies outputs are 
typically measured in terms of monetary units—e.g., the Euro value of the loan portfolio.  
This  consideration  leads  to  two  modifications  of  the  general  framework  presented  above.  
First, because outputs are measured in value terms, it would make little sense to include prices 
in the revenue function.  Instead, we use margin rates to reveal the economic objectives of the 
regional banking group.  The revenue is thus interpreted as the net banking product (the sum 
of each margin rate multiplied by its corresponding output measured in value terms).  As a 
result, efficiency will be measured in value terms (Euros, in our case).  A benefit of this is that 
we can use the monetary values to directly compare and aggregate the efficiency measures of 
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different branches.
9  Second, while the revenue, technical, and allocative efficiency measures 
presented  above  have  a  multiplicative  relationship,  in  our  application  the  three  efficiency 
measures  satisfy  an  additive  decomposition  due  to  the  way  in  which  the  variables  are 
measured: 
 
  Revenue efficiency (maximum NBP – observed NBP) = 
    Technical efficiency (technically efficient NBP – observed NBP) +  (6) 
    Allocative efficiency (maximum NBP – technically efficient NBP). 
 
Since technical efficiency is clearly related to the branch manager effort, we call it the branch 
efficiency.  As we have seen, the allocative inefficiency can be easily interpreted as a product-
mix efficiency that is attributed to the top bank manager.  The adapted model is illustrated in 
the Figure 2, which is a direct analog of Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2.  Optimal Net Banking Product and 
measurement of branch and product-mix inefficiencies 
 
 
Different  environments  likely  manifest  themselves  as  different  output  sets.    Figure  3 
illustrates the case of two different environments, suggesting the importance of contingent 
                                                 
9 When data are available as quantities, the aggregation of efficiency  measures is still possible if one uses 





















Margin rates of the regional 
banking group 
IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2009-ECO-01  16
performance evaluations.  As the technologies can be different for different environments, it 
is  clear  that,  even  under  the  same  margin  rates,  the  optimal  product-mix  likely  will  be 
different.  Though not shown in the Figure 3, it is also possible that margin rates will differ 
across environments.  Thus, a different environment leads to a different optimal product-mix; 
as a consequence, even with the same margin rates, top bank managers should apply different 
product strategies and different incentives to branches in different environments.  Consistent 
with  the  contingency  approach  to  management  control,  relative  performance  is  measured 
separately for each of the different environments in which the lower level units operate.
10  
Banker  et  al.  (1998)  and  others  have  noted  the  importance  of  basing  evaluations  of 
“controllable” factors; “uncontrollable” factors can be accounted for by applying the relative 




Figure 3.  Optimal product-mix and the effect of the environment 
 
 
Finally, we will consider the effect of branch size on performance.  First, it is possible that 
branch size affects the output sets (i.e., technology).  Under an assumption of constant returns 
to scale would yield homothetic boundaries for  ( ) P x  and thus a uniform optimal product-mix 
                                                 
10 As Fisher (1995) noted, the contingency approach to control systems is an intermediate form between the 
situation-specific  and  universalistic  views.    What  distinguishes  the  contingency  approach  and  the  situation-
specific approach is that the former applies to classes of business settings (“environments” in our case) while the 
latter is specific to each entity. 
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for all scales of operations.  Instead, we allow for variable returns to scale, which allows for 
different optimal product-mix at different production scales as illustrated in Figure 4.   In 
Figure 4, we model the same technology but at two different levels of input utilization—input 
vectors  x1  and  x2,  with  2 1. ³     Under  an  assumption  of  variable  returns  to  scale,  the 
boundaries of the output sets  ( ) 1 P x  and  ( ) 2 P x  potentially have different shapes.  As was the 
case for different environments, size differences also lead to different optimal product-mixes, 
and,  as  a  direct  consequence,  top  bank  managers  should  again  apply  different  product 
strategies and different incentives to branches of different size. 
 
Figure 4.  Optimal product-mix and the effect of size (Note:  2 1 x x ³ ) 
Margin rates 
 of the regional banking group 
Optimal product-mix 1  Optimal product-mix 2 
P(x2)  P(x1) 
Cash savings 
Loans 
IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2009-ECO-01Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of the decision making among the central management and 
the branch managers.  The central bank management is solely responsible for making the 
decisions for the branch network (branch location, branch equipment, and output mix) as well 
as for its policies and strategies.  Bank branches are the points of sale for the bank.  The 
responsibilities of the branches obviously include sales, but the branches also play a crucial 
role in the support of the information bank system by maintaining direct relationships with 
local customers.  The branches sell different types of products: deposits, personal loans and 
mortgages, commercial  loans and mortgages, special services (issuing of credit cards  and 
ATM cards), insurance and securities, life insurance, and financial capital (equity); and they 
use three types of resources: human resources, operating capital, and the local customer sales 
base.  The customer base is a specific banking resource considered as the necessary funds to 
allow the bank branch to be a retailer for credit and liquidity services. 
 
Here, we assume that the central bank management has the decision rights with regards to the 
margin rates of the products and chooses the product-mix strategy that maximizes its financial 
situation.    These  factors  depend  on  financial  markets,  interest  rates,  legislation,  regional, 
national, and international competition.  Based on these elements, central bank managers have 
to  formulate  an  incentive  plan.    Conventionally,  bank  branches  are  evaluated  based  on 
productivity indices (and partial productivity indices in particular) and the objectives to be 
reached are declined in sale volume by product.  If the objectives are achieved, the branch’s 
management and the front office sellers receive bonuses/commissions.  This is the instrument 
used by the central management to communicate the product-mix strategy.  Nevertheless, 
branch profitability is evaluated too, but it is not used to communicate product-mix strategy; 
instead, profitability is evaluated to check the selling prices.  To increase the selling volume 




                                                 
12 Within this model bank branches are evaluated with relative performance measures and they are equivalent to 
Banker and Datar (1989), Baiman and Demski (1980), and Holmstrom (1982): the output of the branches is used 
in  the  performance  evaluation  of  the  bank  and  the  output  of  the  bank  is  correlated  with  the  output  of  the 
branches. 
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IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2009-ECO-01Figure  6  shows  the  relationships  between  the  decisions  made  by  the  central  management 
(manifested by the incentives plan) and the actions taken by the branches (manifested by the 
sales volume).  We need at least two performance measures to evaluate the branches’ actions.  
One, to evaluate the ability of the branches to avoid waste of the allocated resources (by the 
central  management);  and  another  to  evaluate  the  ability  of  the  branches  to  apply  the 
incentives plan (as communicated by the central management).  Thus, as described above, we 
compute three performance evaluation measures:  
1.  The technical efficiency, which evaluates possible increases in the NBP of branches 
without changing its product mix but in improving its global productivity; 
2.  The allocative efficiency, which evaluates whether a branch can increase its NBP just 
by changing its product mix and following correctly the incentive plan of the central bank; 
3.  The overall (revenue) efficiency, which evaluates possible increases in the NBP of 
branches by improving its global productivity and changing its product mix. 
 
The activities of bank branches is presented in Figure 7 and can be summarized as follows.   
-  Bank branches offer several products to their customers; these can be grouped by four 
types: cash savings products also known as interest-bearing deposits and simple deposits 
with services related to the management of demand accounts, personal and business loans, 
damage  insurance  products  and  financial  savings  products.    Some  result  from 
intermediation, others do not, although the production of each is the responsibility of the 
branch bank’s general manager. 
-  To sell the products to local customers, the bank branches use three types of resources: 
human  resources,  operating  resources,  and  customer  capital.    Customer  capital  is  a 
specific characteristic of the banking activity.  The bank branch contributes directly to the 
role  of  financial  intermediary  of  the  bank:  it  collects  the  deposits  that  comprise  the 
liabilities on the bank’s income statement and it grants loans that comprise the assets on 
the  bank’s  income  statement.    The  branch’s  customer  capital  can  be  considered  as 
business funds.   
 
Figure 8 presents the proxies chosen to measure the conceptual inputs and outputs discussed 
above.  On the output side, proxies are value of loans portfolio, value of interest-bearing 
deposits portfolio, amount of damage insurance premiums, and amount of financial savings 
portfolio; on the input side, the proxies are the number of full-time equivalent employees, 
operating expenses, and the number of active current accounts. 
IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2009-ECO-01  21





















Decisions made by central management: incentives plan 
Actions made by branch management: maximizing the sale volume 
IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2009-ECO-01  22
 
Figure 7.  The set of relevant inputs and desirable outputs of the branches retailing process 
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·  Number of personnel 
·  Amount of operating 
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·  Cash savings  
·  Loans (personal loans, mortgages, and 
commercial loans) 
·  Damage insurance 
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4.3  The data 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the definition of the retailing 
process of the 1,585 branches on evaluation.  For all of the variables, the median value is 
lower  than  the  mean  value  meaning  that  some  large  values  are  present  in  the  data.    By 
looking at the range, we also see a large variation in size between the small and the large 
branches.    This  observed  variation  will  be  taken  into  account  by  our  model  since  we 
explicitly compute the optimal product-mix at each scale of operation. 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for the 1,585 branches 
Variable  Minimum  Median  Maximum  Mean  St.  dev. 
Number of employees  1  10  47  11  6 
Operating expenses  74  645  3 894  772  460 
Number of accounts  595  5 591  23 767  6 409  3 619 
Cash savings  4 060  42 759  279 083  51 284  35 151 
Loans  2 302  39 469  310 050  48 935  35 369 
Damage insurance products  8  695  5 638  896  664 
Financial savings products  606  24 366  224 983  31 589  25 798 
 
The 1,585 branches are also characterized by different local environments.  As discussed 
above, we will model a production technology specific to each environment.  Branches are 
classified  into  eight  distinct  environments  (cf.  Figure  9).    The  classification  has  been 
established both from experts’ opinion and on data analysis on a set of twelve criteria: rate of 
employee  assets  working  in  the  agricultural  field,  rate  of  employees,  rate  of  operative 
manufacturer, rate of businesses, rate of executives, rate of retirees, proportion of more than 
fifteen years-old studying, rate of unemployment, income per family, proportion of secondary 
residences, proportion of homeowners, and rate of population growth.  The variability in 
market environment probably leads to a specialization in the products sold by the branches.  
In terms of management control, an important question that arises is the determination of the 
right incentive plan for each type of environment. 
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Rural areas with a high rate of employee assets working in the 
agricultural field and a high rate of retirees 
Rural areas with a high rate of operative worker and of employee 
assets working in the agricultural field and a high rate of retirees 
Residential areas with a high rate of businesses, retirees and 
secondary residences 
Peripheral areas with a high rate of population growth, a significant 
portion of large dwellings and homeowners  
Urban areas with a high rate of students and of population growth 
Urban areas with a high rate of unemployment and low incomes 
Urban areas with quite high unemployment and income 
Urban areas with a high rate of executives and high incomes 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the branches among the seventeen  Regional Banking 
Groups (denoted RBG) and among the eight environments.  We note that the banking groups 
are different, especially with regard to their size—the smallest comprises a network of 28 
branches and the largest of 376.  The number of branches per environment is also quite 
variable.  Each banking group operates in at least three different environments.  To face the 
competitive pressure, the trade strategy of all the regional banking groups is to be present in 
all the types of environment of their territory.  Inside each regional banking group, we use a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index  (HHI)  score  to  evaluate  the  concentration  of  the  branches 
among the different environments.  The least concentrated regional banking group is RBG5 
(HHI = 0.146) and the most concentrated one is RBG14 (HHI = 0.465).  We can also note 
that none of the regional banking groups are highly concentrated in solely one environment.   
 
The objective of the regional banking group is to maximize the NBP.  Table 3 presents the 
rate of margins  for the  four outputs specified in this analysis.  Margin rates vary  across 
banking  groups  since  the  margins  depend  on  financial  markets  conditions,  interest  rates, 
legislation and local competition.  There is variability of at least 20% among the rates of 
margins,  even  for  products  such  as  cash  savings  (minimum  is  2.93%  and  the  maximum 
3.38%)  and  loans  (the  minimum  is  4.86%  and  the  maximum  6.00%),  which  are  highly 
regulated products. 
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Table 2.  Distribution of the 1,585 branches among the seventeen regional banking groups and the eight different environments 
 
  ENV1  ENV2  ENV3  ENV4  ENV5  ENV6  ENV7  ENV8  TOTAL  HHI Score 
RBG1  15  9    5  6    2    37  0.251 
RBG2    1  11  12    2  2    28  0.325 
RBG3  11  5  2  5  7  11  17  3  61  0.159 
RBG4  66  52  16  38  13  7  30  2  224  0.193 
RBG5  5  10  2  5  8  11  10  1  52  0.146 
RBG6          3  4  9  1  17  0.331 
RBG7  15  14  11  6  1  1  5    53  0.200 
RBG8  24  14  2  8    5  9  2  64  0.220 
RBG9  11  7  4  20  11  68  34  5  160  0.250 
RBG10  5  5  1  17  6  9  24  20  87  0.180 
RBG11  2    4  2  4  14  24  1  51  0.299 
RBG12  31  11  9  45  20  10  19    145  0.187 
RBG13  7  32    18  6  3  11  5  82  0.227 
RBG14        2  4    15  36  57  0.465 
RBG15  17  39  1  149  29  77  58  6  376  0.240 
RBG16    4  3  6  8  8  24  1  54  0.249 
RBG17  3  6    3  4  6  13  2  37  0.182 
TOTAL  212  209  66  341  130  236  306  85  1,585  0.241 
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Table 3.  Margin rates for regional banking groups 
 
 
Rate of cash 
savings margin 
 
Rate of loans 
margin 
Rate of damage 
insurance 
products margin 
Rate of financial 
savings products 
margin 
RBG1  3.19%  5.70%  9.93%  0.59% 
RBG2  2.95%  5.15%  11.36%  0.53% 
RBG3  2.93%  5.74%  12.93%  0.37% 
RBG4  3.12%  5.69%  11.39%  0.45% 
RBG5  3.21%  6.00%  11.64%  0.60% 
RBG6  3.03%  5.55%  16.73%  0.41% 
RBG7  3.34%  5.40%  12.06%  0.66% 
RBG8  3.23%  5.61%  10.81%  0.57% 
RBG9  3.09%  5.94%  8.41%  0.70% 
RBG10  3.13%  5.07%  10.03%  0.93% 
RBG11  2.97%  5.73%  10.25%  0.56% 
RBG12 3.03%  5.42%  12.82%  0.57% 
RBG13  3.38%  5.61%  10.77%  0.58% 
RBG14  3.11%  4.86%  10.60%  0.69% 
RBG15  3.13%  5.27%  10.34%  0.80% 
RBG16  2.98%  5.75%  11.64%  0.55% 
RBG17  3.14%  5.83%  10.02%  0.61% 
 
Table  4  presents  results  on  the  levels  of  inefficiency.    While  we  compute  the  three 
inefficiency measures at the branch level, we present here aggregate results at the regional 
bank level.  To obtain aggregate measures, we have added the branches’ inefficiencies.  In 
contrast  to  the  traditional  framework  for  which  multiplicative  and  relative  efficiency 
measures are used, the addition of scores is meaningful in our context because we have an 
additive decomposition of the economic inefficiency and we use Euros as the single and 
common unit of measurement for all the types of inefficiencies.  Nevertheless for the sake of 
comparisons among the different regional networks, we have reported the inefficiencies as 
percentages of the regional bank NBP. 
IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2009-ECO-01  27
 








RBG1  27%  5%  32% 
RBG2  16%  12%  28% 
RBG3  28%  22%  51% 
RBG4  13%  30%  42% 
RBG5  12%  13%  24% 
RBG6  15%  40%  55% 
RBG7  12%  4%  16% 
RBG8  18%  11%  29% 
RBG9  24%  13%  37% 
RBG10  9%  8%  18% 
RBG11  17%  11%  29% 
RBG12  22%  9%  32% 
RBG13  15%  8%  23% 
RBG14  13%  9%  22% 
RBG15  8%  7%  16% 
RBG16  19%  11%  30% 
RBG17  21%  15%  36% 
TOTAL  15%  13%  28% 
 
As an example of interpretation of figures in Table 4, the regional bank RGB1 shows an 
inefficiency score of 27% on the branch inefficiency.  This means that if all the branches 
among  this  group  were  technically  efficient,  RGB1  could  improve  its  NBP  by  27%.  
Moreover, the choice of the optimal product-mix would raise the NBP by 5%.  Together, 
improving both technical and allocative efficiency could raise the NBP by almost a third 
(32%).  It is clear that for RGB1, the main source of improvement is at the branch level and 
that  the  top  management  seems  quite  efficient  in  the  incentives  it  gives  to  define  the 
branches’ product-mix depending on their size and their environment.  However, this is not 
the case for all the banking groups.  For example, for RGB6 the main source of improvement 
is at the regional level (40% of inefficiency) while the branch inefficiency is around the 
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sample average.  On the other hand, for RGB15 the total inefficiency is equally split among 
the branches and the top management.  These results are very relevant from a management 
control  point  of  view  in  the  sense  that  they  analyze  the  causes  of  the  economic 
inefficiency.The mean levels of the technical and allocative inefficiencies are quite similar 
(respectively, 15% and 13%), but much more variability is present at the individual level as 
shown by the results.  A simple OLS regression of technical inefficiency on product-mix 
inefficiency shows that there is no correlation among the two types of inefficiencies and we 
can therefore conclude that there is no association between branch management performance 
and  top  bank  management  performance.    (In)efficiency  of  branches  neither  implies  nor 
precludes (in)efficiency of the top bank manager.  We also note a large variation in the level 
of inefficiency between the seventeen bank networks.  Economic inefficiency ranges from 
16% to 55%.  The same variability is observed for the allocative inefficiency (5% - 40%) 
while the range for branch inefficiency is smaller (8% - 28%).   
 
The results presented in Table 4 are derived from a model that explicitly takes into account 
the effects of size and the environment at the branch level.  We now want to test whether 
these  effects  remain  at  the  regional  level.    Indeed,  if  a  regional  group  has  a  great 
concentration of its branches in some specific environments, it may be easier to give the right 
incentives in terms of product-mix and thus the allocative inefficiency could be related to the 
concentration  of  the  branches.    Second,  following  the  same  argument,  if  the  size  of  the 
branches is relatively homogenous among a regional group, it could be easier to manage the 
incentives plan on product-mix and thus the allocative inefficiency could be positively related 
to the heterogeneity in size.  We therefore test for these two hypotheses with OLS regressions 
where  the  dependent  variables  are  a  Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index  of  concentration  and  a 
heterogeneity index of size computed as the variance of branches’ size.  The result is that 
there is no relationship between either the concentration of the branches among the different 
environments or the heterogeneity in size and the regional group allocative inefficiency.   
 
Besides the diagnostic results given above, our model can be used as a tool to analyze more 
deeply the nature of inefficiencies and to suggest corrective actions.  We illustrate here how a 
top bank manager could measure the necessary changes in product-mix which lead to the 
maximal NBP.  From the four outputs we consider, we chose the cash savings as a standard 
and we compute the ratios of other outputs over cash savings.  All the results presented are 
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therefore relative to cash savings.  The first ratio is loans / cash savings for which the results 
are presented in Table 5.
13 
 
Table 5.  Changes in product-mix needed 
to achieve allocative efficiency (loans / cash savings) 
ratio loans / 
cash savings 
ENV1 ENV2  ENV3  ENV4  ENV5  ENV6  ENV7  ENV8  TOTAL 
RGB1  -17%  2%    41%  30%    -1%    4% 
RGB2    -7%  -6%  28%    42%  144%    23% 
RGB3  -20%  -40%  -45%  13%  45%  50%  41%  17%  19% 
RGB4  -42%  -29%  -29%  -4%  8%  -24%  -23%  -26%  -25% 
RGB5  -42%  -18%  -4%  72%  68%  30%  91%  0%  34% 
RGB6          29%  -2%  0%  52%  8% 
RGB7  -6%  -9%  2%  36%  7%  -2%  -3%    0% 
RGB8  0%  -7%  4%  33%    3%  27%  60%  9% 
RGB9  -10%  -12%  18%  87%  120%  44%  93%  46%  58% 
RGB10  -54%  -50%  -41%  -24%  -16%  -21%  17%  -4%  -11% 
RGB11  -43%    -3%  141%  49%  32%  45%  55%  39% 
RGB12  -31%  -8%  9%  31%  20%  19%  8%    8% 
RGB13  -4%  -23%    38%  16%  23%  53%  35%  11% 
RGB14        -12%  -33%    21%  40%  28% 
RGB15  -21%  -17%  0%  24%  4%  -6%  31%  0%  11% 
RGB16    -23%  -4%  12%  31%  18%  93%  21%  49% 
RGB17  -4%  44%    98%  117%  71%  77%  86%  70% 
TOTAL  -25%  -18%  -8%  26%  30%  18%  40%  26%  14% 
 
Table 5 gives the increase or decrease of the ratio loans/cash savings for the entire sample 
and  by  environment.    We  interpret  here  the  first  line.    For  the  group  RBG1  the  ratio 
loans/cash savings has to be increased globally by 4% to get the product-mix efficiency.  
Therefore little inefficiency arises at the aggregate level.  Nevertheless, if we analyze the 
results  environment  by  environment  we  find  much  more  disparities.    For  example,  the 
branches located in ENV1 have to make a reduction of 17% of the ratio (by decreasing the 
                                                 
13 Results for the other ratios (damage insurance/cash savings and financial savings/ cash savings) are presented 
in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
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volume of loans or increasing the volume of cash savings) while the branches located in 
ENV4 have to increase the ratio by 41%.  For other banking groups, we see that some groups 
have to change this ratio substantially.  For example, the group RGB5 has to increase this 
ratio by 34% while the group RGB10 has to reduce it by 11%.  We also notice that the ratio 
has to decrease in rural environments (ENV1-ENV3) while it has to increase in the urban 
environments (ENV4-ENV8).  Without going in further interpretations, we are convinced 
that  these  results  constitute  a  relevant  tool  for  the  regional  managers  in  defining  the 
incentives for each branch according to their environment. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
5.1.  Links with a selected literature 
Benchmarking  is  a  promising  managerial  tool  for  an  organizational  structure  such  as  a 
banking network.  Central management frequently benchmarks branches.  In the construction 
of our model, we use as our point of departure the three-legged stool metaphor of Brickley et 
al.  (2004).    The  efficiency  score  is  calculated  with  respect  to  the  differences  in  the 
environments and in the decision empowerment, and with consideration of the architecture as 
a system of complements.  
 
Our paper also encompasses to the financial literature on positive agency theory and more 
precisely on organizational architecture theory.  Our model is constructed within a normative 
approach of agency theory, but our empirical results show that the choice of performance 
measures is essential since it determines the performance of the entire banking group.  In this 
aspect, we can recognize the three components of the organizational architecture: decision 
rights, incentives plan, and performance measures.  In the construction of our model, we 
consider these three components as the “three legs of a stool” (following Brickley et al.  
2004).  As a second empirical result, we show that the choice of performance measures is 
crucial: performance evaluation is one of the three legs of organizational architecture.  In 
other words, if the chosen performance measures were not incorporated in a banking group 
perspective,  all  the  individual  profitability  gains  which  would  be  obtained  at  a  branch 
managerial level could be lost at central managerial bank level in an increase of the allocative 
inefficiency.  Moreover, in developing a normative agency model and in proposing a positive 
agency interpretation of the empirical results, we follow Jensen’s recommendations (1983) 
which suggested bringing the two agency literatures become closer.  Finally, we show that to 
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optimize the financial results of an organization such as a banking group, it is not enough to 
optimize the individual situation of its entities (bank branches). 
 
5.2.  Discussion of the empirical results 
The efficiency scores calculated have the objective of assisting managerial decision making 
and  in  particular  the  central  regional  bank  managerial  decision  making.    They  are 
performance measures and present quite a few interesting managerial requirements: simple, 
robust, easy to control, adaptive, as complete as possible, and easy to communicate (Little, 
1970).  The efficiency  scores are simple because they are easy to understand and robust 
because there are no absurd answers.  They are easy to control because we have explicitly 
included the decisional power of the branches managers and of the central regional bank 
managers in the model.  Moreover, they are adaptive because in the future we could integrate 
new information such as market share for example and as complete as possible because the 
model used is constructed according to a global vision of the banking group.  Finally, they are 
easy to communicate because they are performance measures that are easy to interpret and 
they are quite familiar ground for banking managers. 
 
We develop two managerial aspects of our empirical results: (i) implications of the results on 
benchmarking practices and (ii) implications of the results on managerial practices. 
(i) The efficiency scores are useful to practice internal benchmarking, they are particularly 
congruent because they respect the controllability principle at the branch level (branches are 
only compared to other branches constrained within same trade area).  But there is another 
interesting managerial aspect, it is to benchmark the regional banking group –in other words 
at the upper aggregate managerial level. 
(ii) Our findings confirm that the product mix strategy (through the rate of margins) has to 
take into account the size and the localization of the branches.  The results of our analysis 
could help the top bank management to adapt the incentives to each branch.  The model 
developed here could also be used as a prospective management tool.  It is based on four key 
variables (margins, size, localization and inputs).  By fixing any three of them, this allows us 
to simulate the last one.  For example, bank top management could anticipate the effect of 
changes in the rate of margins on optimal output mixes to adapt their incentives plan.  On this 
aspect  our  model  catches  the  Banker  and  Datar  (1989)  paper  up:  “It  states  that  optimal 
compensation contract design was split into two stages: developing a measure of evaluation 
for managerial performance, and using that measure to choose a compensation contract”.
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Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Changes in product-mix needed to achieve 
allocative efficiency (damage insurance/cash savings) 
Damage insurance/ 
cash savings 
ENV1  ENV2  ENV3  ENV4  ENV5  ENV6  ENV7  ENV8  TOTAL 
RGB1  -5%  -25%    92%  -9%    -1%    3% 
RGB2    -34%  -30%  -11%    -23%  -17%    -21% 
RGB3  3%  -23%  -17%  87%  32%  47%  54%  -13%  32% 
RGB4  23%  -23%  -26%  35%  7%  -9%  11%  -33%  7% 
RGB5  -46%  -44%  -7%  6%  -21%  -12%  3%  0%  -18% 
RGB6          -7%  -22%  -23%  -30%  -21% 
RGB7  7%  -3%  -9%  173%  -17%  43%  54%    25% 
RGB8  -27%  -41%  -14%  22%    -22%  -13%  -55%  -22% 
RGB9  -16%  -9%  23%  76%  22%  9%  45%  -44%  22% 
RGB10  -48%  -47%  -17%  -14%  -8%  -19%  8%  -26%  -14% 
RGB11  -19%    -19%  57%  22%  12%  20%  -30%  14% 
RGB12  -10%  -8%  -20%  10%  -15%  -5%  -3%    -4% 
RGB13  -29%  -24%    66%  -25%  7%  22%  -26%  3% 
RGB14        24%  -11%    20%  -18%  -6% 
RGB15  -38%  -28%  0%  -8%  -13%  -14%  -11%  -48%  -14% 
RGB16    -31%  -10%  -19%  -16%  -6%  14%  -62%  -3% 
RGB17  -3%  78%    178%  134%  117%  161%  62%  120% 
TOTAL  -4%  -21%  -17%  17%  -1%  1%  19%  -24%  2% 
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Table A2.  Changes in product-mix needed to achieve 
allocative efficiency (financial savings/cash savings) 
Financial savings / 
cash savings 
ENV1  ENV2  ENV3  ENV4  ENV5  ENV6  ENV7  ENV8  TOTAL 
RGB1  19%  34%    34%  -4%    23%    21% 
RGB2    -39%  20%  49%    28%  17%    31% 
RGB3  -53%  -45%  -47%  -31%  -54%  -41%  -42%  -29%  -44% 
RGB4  -65%  -59%  -57%  -56%  -48%  -54%  -53%  -61%  -59% 
RGB5  81%  109%  14%  53%  33%  40%  92%  0%  66% 
RGB6          -44%  -53%  -55%  -72%  -54% 
RGB7  30%  17%  7%  38%  38%  9%  12%    21% 
RGB8  6%  -15%  9%  4%    5%  5%  -14%  0% 
RGB9  -12%  -28%  -3%  -15%  -35%  -4%  -7%  -13%  -10% 
RGB10  33%  78%  -14%  57%  38%  37%  25%  16%  34% 
RGB11  -19%    20%  124%  12%  27%  57%  18%  41% 
RGB12  -19%  -8%  -6%  -1%  11%  0%  28%    0% 
RGB13  -2%  12%    12%  3%  45%  63%  6%  18% 
RGB14        16%  103%    44%  -5%  16% 
RGB15  7%  1%  0%  11%  18%  22%  14%  -9%  13% 
RGB16    31%  38%  34%  9%  19%  14%  44%  19% 
RGB17  -28%  22%    -13%  17%  -12%  18%  -7%  6% 
TOTAL  -20%  -5%  -9%  6%  3%  8%  11%  -3%  1% 
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